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The US Financial Crisis, Emerging Markets and the Effects of IMF Loans 
 
Bridgette Bain 





The main hypothesis of this paper is that emerging markets with outstanding debt from the IMF 
and their economies are more severely affected by shocks to the world than countries that do not 
undertake IMF debt. The effect that shocks have on these economies is also dependent upon the 
size of the debt borrowed. This paper analyzes the effects that outstanding IMF debt has on 
emerging markets. Essentially, it observes the responses of emerging markets to shocks in their 
economy when they are indebted to the IMF. We observe 35 emerging markets as defined by Dow 
Jones in 2010 and find that the GDP of the countries indebted to the IMF were more adversely 
affected by the US Financial Crisis than their counterparts who never indulged in IMF credit as 
well as those countries that were able to fully repay their debt. Our analysis indicated that not 
only being indebted to the IMF affected their ability to recover from the crisis but examines how 
the size of the debt played an integral role in their economy’s stability. Ultimately, we conclude 
that the IMF may be at fault in enabling emerging markets to collapse from accumulation of debt 
from which they are unable to repay. 
 
Keywords: IMF Debt, Emerging Markets, US Financial Crisis, Economic Stability 
 
 
1   INTRODUCTION 
 
According to the University of Iowa Center for International Finance and Development, emerging 
markets are countries that have strategically positioned themselves to experience rapid growth and 
industrialization (Li, 2012). These countries not only experience rapid growth spurts but award 
lucrative returns to risk loving investors in areas of trade, technology transfers, and foreign direct 
investments. Ashoka Mody (2004) in “What is an emerging market?” also describes it as the place 
where a country is positioned such that it is searching for an acute tradeoff between commitment 
and flexibility in contractual agreements. As noted by the World Bank, the five largest emerging 
markets on the globe are China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Russia (Li, 2012). 
 
Evidently, emerging markets often suffer detrimentally from shocks that hit their economies. Often 
times, these shocks are not terribly severe and developed nations almost always fully recover from 
them. Unfortunately, one of the main characteristics of an emerging market that lends itself to the 
mercy of these shocks is the volatility of these underdeveloped nations. Since many developing 
countries are not fully stable, they are unable to withstand normal or, much less so, severe 
abnormalities that may hit their economies. 
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According to the Business Wire News database, February 2009, the US Financial Crisis of 2008, 
also known as the Global Financial Crisis, has been the worst financial crisis experienced by the 
US since the Great Depression in the 1930’s (Pendery, 2009). The crisis, triggered by a lack of 
liquidity in the US markets, led to a housing bubble, the necessary bailout of multi-billion dollar 
corporations, and a devastated investor confidence in the global stock market. 
 
Unfortunately, but not completely unbeknown to the public, the United States Senate issued a report 
to confirm that the crisis was not a natural disaster, but the spiraling effect of too many risky 
investments, deliberate inaccuracy of credit ratings, and little to no monitoring. 
 
Consequently, this financial crisis could have been prevented with an earlier intervention. 
Nonetheless, this paper will aim to examine the effects that the crisis had on emerging markets, 
segmented into categories of countries that have outstanding IMF debt, have repaid all their IMF 





















Figure 1. GDP of Countries with Emerging Markets That Have Never Been Indebted to the 
Fund, 1990-2011 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the GDP of a sample of emerging markets that never received IMF credit within 
the period 1990-2011.This data was collected from the World Bank World Development Indicators, 
International Financial Statistics of the IMF, IHS Global Insight, and Oxford Economic forecasting, 
as well as estimated and projected values developed by the Economic Research Service all 
converted to a 2005 base year. (When this data was gathered, because of the use of fixed exchange 
rates, for consistent and accurate interpretation, the exchange rates of the 2005 USD was utilized in 
calculating the listed GDPs).  
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We can observe nx from this figure that during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, there was not an 
extensive dip in GDP of countries who never undertook IMF credit, and most of these economies 




























Figure 2. GDP of Countries with Emerging Markets that Have Fully Repaid Their Debt, 1990-
2011 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the GDP of countries who received IMF credit but had fully repaid the debt 
within the 1990-2011 period. From our diagram, we can also observe that most of these countries 
were able to weather the 2007-2009 financial crisis and flourish afterward. 
 
Figure 3 highlights the GDP of countries in the period 1990-2011 that are currently indebted to the 
IMF. In this figure, it is easier to observe the drop-in country GDP during the 2007-2009 period. 
This drop that is conspicuous in Romania, Hungary and Latvia are not quite as common in countries 
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Figure 3. GDP of Countries with Emerging Markets Which Are Currently Indebted to the Fund, 
1990-2011 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an organization reconstructed in 1944 with a defined 
mission: to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international 
trade, promote high employment levels, sustain economic growth, and reduce poverty around the 
globe. Feldstein (1998) notes that the IMF was originally formed to help countries cope with trade 
deficits and temporary shortages of foreign exchange but has a new emphasis on structural and 
institutional reform, an avenue that has not always been a part of the IMF’s agenda. 
 
As noted in Bird (1996), the demand for IMF credits is positively correlated with balance-of- 
payments deficits and negatively correlated with availability of alternative means of financing. 
Evidently, balance-of payments deficits are a direct spillover of domestic fiscal and monetary 
mismanagement, increased import prices, and overvalued exchange rates. Ultimately, Bird 
concludes that since the IMF is a source of last resort, lending it can be expected to be inversely 
related to the level of economic development in an emerging market. In addition, studies conducted 
around IMF lending suggests that the probability that a country will request IMF credit, in the short 
run, is positively related to its previous involvement with the Fund (Bird, 1996). 
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He also notes that many countries tend to resist borrowing from the IMF even if they are in dire 
need because of the perceived political cost attached. In addition, while the Fund had high 
stipulations and conditions attached to borrowing, researchers have found that the Fund relaxed its 
conditions and requirements necessary to receive credit immediately after the 1982 debt crisis. 
Consequently, it became easier at this time for countries to engage in IMF borrowing; this action 
taken by the IMF increased the likelihood of countries being unable to repay their debts as well as 
the hold that the Fund had on their economy. 
 
He determined that since a loan from the IMF is laid out as temporary and revolving, receivership 
of the loan should be looked at as a failure on a country’s path. In addition, if the Fund’s program 
does not encourage economic improvement for countries who took credit but instead engender the 
same countries to engage in requesting additional credits without showing signs of paralleling 
improvement, the Fund fails at its pre-assigned purpose. 
 
Bird (1996) finds that though countries exhibit the criteria necessary to meet conditions to receive 
the Fund’s credit, the goal of improving the country’s macroeconomic conditions is often left 
unrealized. While some argue that the Fund does a poor job on following up on the countries that 
undertake their debt to ensure that they comply with the conditions with which the money was lent, 
there is also speculation, arguing, that these countries may have set their goals unrealistically high 
(Bird, 1996). 
 
Joyce (1992) finds that countries more likely to enter Fund arrangements are countries which tend 
to have excessively high ratios of government expenditure to GDP and low ratios of international 
reserves to imports. These countries evidently exhibit signs of distress, contributing to the theory 
of failure on their part. Logit regressions conducted by Joyce (1992) on  29 countries during the 
period 1972-1984 illustrate that the most significant determinants of a country’s likelihood to apply 
for IMF credit are inflation, export growth, the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to imports, the 
ratio of external debt to GNP, the ratio of net foreign direct investment to GNP, and the rate of 
nominal exchange rate depreciation. In addition, it was found by Edwards and Santaella (1993) that 
participation in an IMF program is a determinant in a country’s likelihood to devalue its currency 
as well. 
 
Oftentimes the IMF has been accused of strategically positioning itself to have a semi-permanent 
presence in many needy, developing countries. The programs that they initiate and fund sometimes 
enable countries in their downward spiral, causing them to be dependent on their (the IMF’s) 
funding for a long haul. 
 
In the 1980s, the only users of the Fund were developing nations. The need for IMF funding 
exponentially increased during the oil shocks of the 1970s and the rapid growth of commercial bank 
in the 1980s which led to the debt crisis. Initially the Fund worked as a credit union, pooling the 
funds of various countries allowing each to draw from it as necessary. After the crises of the 80s 
and the oil shock of the 70s, the role of the IMF began to shift. The IMF began to act as a financial 
intermediary, borrowing resources from one group of countries and lending to another group. As 
the Fund’s role began to change they started to take on a more political agenda encouraging its 
members to utilize their credit. Finally, the Fund is now being criticized for being part of the 
problem by taking resources from debtor countries instead of creating wealth. 
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3   METHODOLOGY 
 
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether a relationship exists between an emerging market 
having IMF credit and the ability to withstand shocks, specifically the US Financial Crisis. The 
contribution I intend to make with this paper is to decipher whether it is unbeneficial in the long 
run for countries to accept IMF credit, particularly for countries that are more likely to default on 
their IMF loans. The first step will be to group the emerging markets into three categories: countries 
that currently owe the IMF, countries that once had IMF credit but fully repaid it all, and countries 
that never engaged in credit dealings with the IMF. 
 
The emerging markets that I will consider are countries defined as emerging markets by Dow Jones 
in 2010. This list includes Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Columbia, Czech 
Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
 
Qatar, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey and United Arab 
Emirates. Though there are many more emerging markets across the globe, the countries selected 
have more easily attainable historical data available (citation here). The goal is to observe whether 
taking on IMF credit has an effect on the GDP of an emerging market. 
 
First, we gather data on our 35 emerging markets regarding loans solicited from the IMF. This data 
is publicly available on the IMF’s official website. We then divide our sample into 3 groups, the 
number indicating the IMF credit status: 
 
1. Countries that never accepted credit from the IMF (-1) 
2. Countries that have accepted credit but currently have a zero balance and (0) 
3. Countries that have accepted credit and are still in the repayment period. (1) 
 
The next step would be to gather data on the GDP growth rates of the 35 emerging markets from 
1980 to 2009. The GDP growth rates, according to Bartelsman and Beaulieu (2004) in ‘A Consistent 
Accounting of US Productivity Growth’, are the sum of income received by all sectors of an 
economy in a country. It includes all wages, taxes, and profits less subsidies. The number should 
reflect the market value of all final goods and services made within the borders of the  country  in  
a  specific  year.  Consequently,  this  is  a  good  indicator  of  measuring  the temperature of an 
economy, particularly in and around a crisis. For this reason, we consider GDP as the sole 
explanatory variable in determining a country’s ability to survive a financial crisis. 
 
From this step we would find the descriptive statistics of the GDP growth rates from 1980 to 2009 
of each emerging market. If any country has less than 10 years of growth rate data it would be 
omitted from the data set. This would avoid any unexplainable variances in the means. More 
specifically, if any event occurred in a particular region at a specific time period, we want all the 
growth rates to be reflective of the event. Needless to say, if some growth rates are missing, it would 
create a bias in the data. 
 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the GDP growth rates. These include the mean, standard 
deviation, variance, minimum and maximum of each country. We can observe that Kuwait, Latvia, 
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Slovakia and Lithuania have the highest standard deviation of growth rates from 1981-2010. In 
contrast, rapidly growing economies like China, Oman and India have the highest mean growth 
rates. This is indicative of the steadily increasing growth rates of more stable economies in spite of 
shocks experienced, as expected. 
 
Table 2 represents the descriptive statistics on the emerging markets’ GDP in billions. Similar to 
Table 1, we want to observe and analyze the mean, variance, maximum and minimum of the GDP 
of the emerging markets represented in our data set. It is noteworthy to observe that China, Russia, 
Brazil and Mexico also have among the highest average GDP. These emerging markets are the 
fastest growing in the world. 
 
Table 3 notes the total amount drawn by the emerging markets over the period 1980-2009 as well 
as the IMF credit status of each emerging market. This data is divided up into 3 variables as 
previously defined. -1 for “never received credit from the IMF during our time period 1980 to 
2009”, 0 for “received credit from IMF but currently has no outstanding debt” and 1 for “received 
credit from IMF and still carries a balance on the account.” 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of countries’ annual GDP growth rates (in percentages) over the 
period 1981-2010 
Country Mean Std Dev Variance Minimum Maximum 
China 10.09 2.83 8.01 3.80 15.20 
Oman 6.29 5.08 25.79 -3.44 17.05 
India 6.27 2.26 5.13 1.06 9.82 
Malaysia 5.96 4.04 16.29 -7.36 10.00 
Thailand 5.63 4.55 20.71 -10.51 13.29 
Indonesia 5.35 4.07 16.55 -13.13 9.08 
Mauritius 5.06 2.18 4.74 0.38 9.74 
Pakistan 4.97 1.99 3.96 1.01 7.92 
Egypt 4.97 1.87 3.51 1.08 9.91 
Sri Lanka 4.87 1.91 3.67 -1.55 8.01 
Chile 4.72 4.42 19.54 -10.32 12.28 
Jordan 4.52 4.96 24.64 -13.45 18.66 
Bahrain 4.42 4.51 20.38 -7.56 12.87 
Turkey 4.33 4.41 19.47 -5.70 9.49 
Morocco 3.81 4.68 21.91 -6.58 12.22 
Slovakia 3.76 8.86 78.50 -14.57 42.12 
Poland 3.52 2.63 6.92 -7.00 7.09 
Colombia 3.47 2.26 5.10 -4.20 6.90 
Kuwait 3.44 10.77 116.04 -19.03 33.99 
United Arab Emirates 3.41 6.96 48.43 -18.78 17.53 
Philippines 3.16 3.52 12.37 -7.32 7.63 
Peru 3.10 6.15 37.83 -11.80 12.82 
Argentina 2.62 6.51 42.40 -10.89 12.67 
Brazil 2.60 3.32 11.05 -4.39 7.99 
Mexico 2.42 3.64 13.28 -6.22 8.77 
South Africa 2.30 2.42 5.85 -2.14 5.60 
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Czech Republic 2.08 3.53 12.46 -11.61 6.81 
Estonia 1.92 7.37 54.35 -21.17 10.80 
Bulgaria 1.87 5.30 28.05 -9.12 10.94 
Lithuania 1.63 7.69 59.15 -21.26 10.25 
Latvia 1.59 9.26 85.82 -32.12 12.23 
Hungary 1.32 3.75 14.07 -11.89 6.22 
Romania 1.24 5.71 32.55 -12.90 9.43 
Russia 1.12 6.32 39.90 -14.53 10.00 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of annual mean GDP in billions from 1981-2010 
 Mean Std 
Deviation 
Variance Minimum Maximum 
China $ 1,262.17 $ 1,036.35 $ 1,074,014.61 $ 216.31 $ 3,834.55 
Russia $ 719.16 $ 138.46 $ 19,170.19 $ 484.77 $ 943.87 
Brazil $ 712.19 $ 170.77 $ 29,162.93 $ 476.71 $ 1,092.51 
Mexico $ 663.47 $ 158.23 $ 25,035.69 $ 460.50 $ 935.60 
India $ 527.64 $ 292.24 $ 85,401.51 $ 201.39 $ 1,241.58 
Turkey $ 335.60 $ 121.62 $ 14,791.33 $ 162.49 $ 564.02 
Poland $ 227.07 $ 74.75 $ 5,587.47 $ 136.60 $ 382.46 
Indonesia $ 202.78 $ 85.72 $ 7,347.64 $ 80.88 $ 377.28 
South Africa $ 196.83 $ 44.21 $ 1,954.95 $ 147.13 $ 288.44 
Argentina $ 152.27 $ 40.19 $ 1,615.02 $ 106.38 $ 253.62 
Thailand $ 118.52 $ 52.84 $ 2,792.52 $ 41.77 $ 210.08 
Colombia $ 113.13 $ 34.52 $ 1,191.77 $ 66.38 $ 183.22 
Czech Republic $ 103.95 $ 19.02 $ 361.64 $ 77.92 $ 144.67 
Romania $ 90.30 $ 14.21 $ 202.05 $ 70.71 $ 123.89 
United Arab Emirates $ 88.64 $ 37.33 $ 1,393.41 $ 45.58 $ 165.23 
Malaysia $ 88.02 $ 44.72 $ 1,999.45 $ 30.82 $ 171.47 
Hungary $ 87.04 $ 14.20 $ 201.73 $ 69.71 $ 112.81 
Chile $ 78.25 $ 35.20 $ 1,239.30 $ 32.32 $ 138.73 
Pakistan $ 78.08 $ 31.21 $ 973.88 $ 32.79 $ 139.62 
Philippines $ 76.78 $ 23.91 $ 571.82 $ 49.28 $ 131.14 
Egypt $ 68.61 $ 28.01 $ 784.31 $ 30.80 $ 131.24 
Peru $ 62.90 $ 19.00 $ 361.14 $ 43.75 $ 112.14 
Slovakia $ 52.88 $ 15.22 $ 231.73 $ 29.45 $ 85.84 
Kuwait $ 52.85 $ 21.14 $ 447.08 $ 28.60 $ 95.24 
Morocco $ 44.33 $ 14.65 $ 214.53 $ 24.63 $ 75.41 
Bulgaria $ 24.63 $ 4.46 $ 19.86 $ 19.58 $ 34.80 
Oman $ 22.41 $ 9.52 $ 90.72 $ 7.01 $ 42.38 
Lithuania $ 21.39 $ 4.66 $ 21.72 $ 13.91 $ 31.67 
Sri Lanka $ 17.08 $ 7.24 $ 52.35 $ 8.01 $ 33.25 
Latvia $ 12.77 $ 3.16 $ 10.00 $ 8.12 $ 19.80 
Estonia $ 10.26 $ 2.66 $ 7.07 $ 6.68 $ 16.42 
Bahrain $ 9.00 $ 4.12 $ 16.98 $ 4.38 $ 17.82 
Jordon $ 8.78 $ 3.61 $ 13.01 $ 4.60 $ 16.74 
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Mauritius $ 4.35 $ 1.86 $ 3.44 $ 1.79 $ 7.82 
 
 
Table 3: Debt incurred by countries through IMF lending 
Country Total Amt drawn in SDR's (millions) IMF credit status 
Argentina 23,478,810.00 0 
Brazil 62,128.72 0 
Turkey 36,099.00 1 
Indonesia 11,104.82 0 
Romania 10,100.00 1 
Hungary 7,693.70 1 
Russia 6,926.16 0 
Pakistan 6,262.46 1 
India 6,107.93 0 
Thailand 2,760.00 0 
Mexico 1,939.50 0 
Philippines 1,908.63 0 
Chile 1,370.25 0 
Latvia 982.24 1 
Bulgaria 867.62 0 
China 597.73 0 
Jordan 341.06 1 
Poland 283.30 0 
Morocco 276.40 0 
Sri Lanka 205.89 1 
Egypt 147.20 0 
Lithuania 134.55 0 
Mauritius 98.50 0 
Czech Republic 70.00 0 
Slovakia 32.15 0 
Bahrain 0.00 -1 
Colombia 0.00 -1 
Estonia 0.00 -1 
Kuwait 0.00 -1 
Malaysia 0.00 -1 
Oman 0.00 -1 
Peru 0.00 -1 
Qatar 0.00 -1 
South Africa 0.00 -1 
United Arab Emirates 0.00 -1 
Note:  Special  Drawing  Rights  (SDRs)  is  an  asset  of  the  IMF  known  as  international reserves 
designed to supplement the reserves of its member countries. 
 
The next step in our procedure was to complete several regressions. The purpose of the regressions 
is to analyze the relationships between average annual GDP, GDP growth variance, IMF loan 
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position, and total debt incurred courtesy the IMF. Our goal in this process is to determine whether 
the independent variables are significant, correlated, or causal of other variables. 
 
In Regression 1, the dependent variable is the total amount withdrawn in millions by all the debtor 
countries in our sample. The exogenous variables are the GDP growth rates of these countries from 
the period 2000-2010. 
 
Table 4: OLS Regression and ANOVA table with amount withdrawn in millions as the dependent 
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Ttl_Amt_ Wthdrawn= -2.39*106 – 3.61*104 Xt + 1.90*105 Xt+1 – 1.21*106 Xt+2 – 4.03*104        
Xt+3+2.42*105 Xt+4 + 3.73*105 Xt+5 +3.14*104 Xt+6 + 7.82*104 Xt+7 + 1.56*105 Xt+8 – 2.21*105 
Xt+9 +3.79*105 Xt+10                                                                                                                      (1) 
 
Equation 1 is such that Xt = annual growth rate in year 2000. The R-square of our regression is 
0.87; however, this is mostly caused by the correlation between our X variables. Nonetheless, the 
growth rates of 2009 which are significant at the 5 percent level are negative. The year 2009 is the 
documented climax of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. A negative coefficient indicates that as growth 
rates rise in that year, the amount borrowed by the country should decrease. This illustrates that 
there exists a negative relationship between IMF debt and growth rates as hypothesized. 
Additionally, in 2010, the coefficient of the growth rates predictor is positive, which indicates that 
at the end of the crisis, borrowing may have been positively correlated with growth rates. 
 
In regression 2, the data selected holds the IMF status: 1= currently indebted to the Fund and -1= 
never engaged in borrowing from the IMF. The dependent variable is the log of average annual 
GDP from 1981-2010. The independent variables are IMF credit status, ratio of amount withdrawn 
to average annual GDP, and total amount withdrawn. 
 
Table 5: OLS Regression with countries of IMF status 1, -1 
(Currently owe IMF and never borrowed funds from IMF) dependent variable is log GDP 
 
Regression Statistics   
Multiple R 0.568097315 
R Square 0.322734559 
Adjusted R Square 0.153418199 
Standard Error 0.460514658 
Observations 16 
ANOVA df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 1.212703751 0.404234584 1.906103811 0.182466718 
Residual 12 2.544885004 0.21207375   
Total 15 3.757588755    
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 2.069159133 0.162281829 12.75040553 2.45324E-08 
IMF credit status -0.012654546 0.162281829 -0.077978821 0.939130074 
Ratio of -0.003476915 0.00380212 -0.91446744 0.378479895 
Withdrawn:GDP     
Total withdrawn -2.02863E-05 1.49283E-05 -1.358919272 0.199165817 
***=significant at 1% level; **= significant at 5% level; *= significant at 10% level 
 
Regression equation: 
Lg Mean GDP= 2.07 –0.01 IMF credit status - 0.003 Amt owed: GDP – .00002 Total withdrawn 
(2) 
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From equation (2) we can see that the ratio of amount owed to IMF to GDP and the total amount 
withdrawn has a negative impact on the mean GDP of the country. However, these variables are 
not significant at a 5% level of significance, so we do not consider them. 
 
Table 6: OLS Regression with countries of IMF status 1, 0 
















           dl           SS                MS              F                  Significance F 
 
Regression 3 2.640488988 0.880162996 2.19818629 0.118323935 
Residual 21 8.408487941 0.400404188   
Total 24 11.04897693    
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 1.917754196 0.159530292 12.02125422 7.04778E-11 
IMF credit status -0.222655546 0.287524967 -0.774386821 0.447333669 
Ratio of Withdrawn:GDP * -0.000199058 0.000104176 -1.910782333 0.069780875 
Total withdrawn* 1.31618E-06 6.66613E-07 1.974424823 0.061630028 
***=significant at 1% level; **= significant at 5% level; *= significant at 10% level 
 
Regression equation: 




Equation (3) exhibits similar characteristics as equation (2); however, in equation (3) the ratio of 
amount withdrawn to GDP and total amount withdrawn are significant at a 10 percent level. Since 
the two groups in the discussion are countries that both owed the IMF but one group fully repaid 
the debt while one is still indebted to the Fund, the total amount withdrawn is indicative of the fact 
that if we consider independently countries that repaid their debt versus countries that were unable 
   Regression Statistics   
Multiple R 0.488856222 
R Square 0.238980406 
Adjusted R Square 0.130263321 
Standard Error 0.63277499 
Observations 25   
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to repay their debt then the total withdrawn and the ratio of the amount withdrawn to GDP affects 
the country’s average annual GDP growth rate. 
 
Regression 4 considers countries that never owed the IMF and those that no longer owe the Fund. 
 
Table 7: OLS Regression with countries of IMF status -1, 0 
(Never engaged in IMF borrowing and currently paid their debt) dependent variable is log GDP 
 
 Regression Statistics   
Multiple R 0.535114824     
R Square 0.286347874     
Adjusted R Square 0.193262815     
Standard Error 0.540694115     
Observations  27     
ANOVA df  SS    MS F Significance F 
Regression** 3  2.697978726 0.899326 3.076195847 0.047689357 
Residual 23  6.724052887 0.29235   
Total 26  9.422031612    
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 1.918648279 0.136321991  14.07439 8.6214E-13 
IMF credit status -0.1631654  0.22598016   -0.72203 0.477550805 
Ratio of 
Withdrawn:GDP** 
-0.000201336 8.90759E-05  -2.26027 0.033578383 
Total withdrawn** 1.33078E-06  5.6999E-
07 
  2.334752 0.02864839 
***=significant at 1% level; **= significant at 5% level; *= significant at 10% level  
 
Regression equation: 
Lg Mean GDP= 1.92 - 0.16 IMF credit status - 0.000 Amt owed: GDP – .000001 Total withdraw 
(4) 
 
Equation (4) illustrates that when we consider countries that currently do not owe the IMF and 
countries that never owed the IMF, there is significance in the regression at a 5 percent level. In 
addition, the total amount withdrawn, and the amount withdrawn to GDP ratio are also significant 
at a 5 percent level. Therefore, we can assert that there is a significant difference in the growth rates 
of countries who took an IMF loan versus those who never took on their debt regardless of their 
ability to repay the debt. 
 
The next step of our analysis considers the causal relationship between the variables. When we 
conduct Granger Causality tests, Table 8 yields our results. 
 
Journal for the Advancement of Developing Economies  2012 Volume 1 Issue 1 
 
Page 66                                                                             Institute for the Advancement of Developing Economies 2012 
 
Table 8: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests among Variables 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Lags: 2 Obs F-Statistic Prob ability 
GROWTH_RATES does not Granger Cause LOG_AVG_GDP** 32 3.50933 0.04418 
LOG_AVG_GDP does not Granger Cause GROWTH_RATES 1.07407 0.35577 
GROWTH_RATES does not Granger Cause IMF_CREDIT_STATUS** 32 5.10114 0.0132 
IMF_CREDIT_STATUS does not Granger Cause GROWTH_RATES 0.0 156 0.98453 
AVG_GROWTH_RATE does not Granger Cause IMF_CREDIT_STATUS 32 2.14053 0.13712 





AVG_GROWTH_RATE does not Granger Cause GROWTH_RATES 32 1.89427 0.1 6989 
GROWTH_RATES does not Granger Cause AVG_GROWTH_RATE 1.19586 0.31796 
***=significant at 1% level; **= significant at 5% level; *= significant at 10% level 
 
The results of our Granger Causality tests in Table 8 indicate that at a 10 percent level of 
significance, IMF credit status Granger Causality tests cause average annual growth rates. This 





Essentially, we can conclude that there exists a causal relationship between IMF credit status and 
average growth rates. This relationship is identified by Granger Causality tests. In addition, when 
we consider two groups of the three, (never undertook debt, fully repaid debt and currently 
indebted) in one regression, we find that total amount withdrawn, and the ratio of amount 
withdrawn, and GDP are significant explanatory variables in determining average annual growth 
rates. In both equations (3) and (4), the ratio of amount withdrawn to GDP is negative and 
significant at the 10 percent and 5 percent level of significance. This is indicative that this amount 
withdrawn has a negative impact on the log of average GDP. The implication of the result is that 
borrowing from the IMF, which was designed to boost the borrower’s economy, is actually having 
a negative impact on the country’s growth rate. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Our results indicate that the debt relationship between emerging markets and the IMF plays an 
integral role in determining the growth rates of these counties’ GDP. Ultimately, these results 
implicate the need for several IMF policy adjustments. 
 
Firstly, many of the decisions made by the IMF are advised informally by countries represented 
by the G-7, G-20 and G-24. The majority of these countries are not emerging markets and, 
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consequently the decisions made by the IMF are not always in the best interest of emerging 
markets’ economies. The Board of Governors, the head of the decision-making body of the IMF, 
needs to be comprised of more emerging markets or at least better represented by them. 
 
In addition, the IMF needs to be more diligent in following up on its debtors after the loan has 
been dispersed. Initially, there are certain requirements that the country must meet in order to 
qualify to participate in the SDR program. However, if the program is designed to inject funds 
into an economy to assist it to function better and if the countries are experiencing a decline in 
GDP after borrowing, then they are not using the funds as initially indicated. 
 
According to the IMF, its conditions for lending often stem from a country’s state of being either 
in or near an economic crisis. Evidently, the IMF can stand to be more proactive in detecting 
countries that are beginning on a steady decline to provide funds with a more preventative 
motive than crisis assistance. 
 
Ultimately, we can conclude that the answer to our research question is not to prevent emerging 
markets from borrowing from the IMF but to encourage the IMF to do more due diligence on its 
member countries to prevent them from experiencing a crisis as well as following up on their 
progress after the finances are dispersed. Additionally, it is critical for emerging markets around 
the globe to have a greater presence on the Fund’s Board of Governance so that their interests 
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